Regulatory Density Test
When you need this method
A company points to regulation as its moat: "Our customers are legally required to do this." Whether that actually creates defensibility remains unexamined. Regulation-forced demand is frequently confused with a protected position, with consequences for valuation, strategy, and competitive assumptions.
Approach
- 1Sharpen the regulatory claim: which law, which obligation, which deadline drives the demand?
- 2Ask the core question: does the obligation apply equally to every vendor in the market or does this company fulfill it exclusively better?
- 3If it applies to all alike, classify the finding as a demand strength, not a positioning strength.
- 4Only attest a genuine positioning strength where the obligation is fulfilled exclusively better, through approvals, data, or integration depth.
- 5Carry the classification into valuation and strategy: deadline-driven demand can be harvested, but it does not defend itself.
Typical application
A typical case: a B2B SaaS in the compliance segment grows fast because a new EU directive forces its customer group to act. The pitch presents the regulation as a moat. The density test shows the obligation hits every competitor equally, any vendor can harvest the same demand. The real strategic question shifts from "how long will the regulation carry us?" to "what is the company doing to stay defensible after the deadline?".
Limits and counter-indications
The test is a Convios-internal scanning discipline and has not been independently validated. It delivers a classification, not a forecast of market development or valuation. Regulatory situations change; the finding holds at the time of assessment and must be repeated when new rules arrive.
How to measure impact
A suitable observation: the share of new business tied to regulatory deadlines, and the win rate against competitors addressing the same obligation.
Related methods
Tools for this
Sources
- 1.The Theory of Economic Regulation (opens in a new tab) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), RAND Corporation (George J. Stigler) · 1971 · academic and scholarly literature · supports the underlying mechanismDevelops the theory that regulation is demanded by the industry it affects and shaped to that industry's benefit, with control over market entry being one of four goods an industry can obtain from the state. The paper is theoretical, supported by selected industry evidence; the conclusion that an advantage arises only where the rule bites unevenly is an inference drawn for this method, not a statement of the source.
- 2.The Cost of Regulatory Compliance in the United States (NBER Working Paper 30691) (opens in a new tab) · National Bureau of Economic Research (Francesco Trebbi, Miao Ben Zhang) · 2022 · academic and scholarly literature · limits the methodEstablishes that compliance cost does not scale proportionally with company size but bites hardest at firms of around five hundred employees, meaning a rule that is formally equal for all works out unequally.
Origin: Convios